Introduction
The Salafi-jihadi ideology -the foundation of many of today's (most notorious) terrorist organizations -grew into a distinct doctrine that rejects traditional Salafism (Salafiyya ʻIlmiyya) only around 2003, after al-Qaeda had launched attacks in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), Yemen (2000) , the United States (2001) and Saudi Arabia (2003) .1 Salafi-jihadis embrace violence as an appropriate and necessary reaction to what they regard as attacks on Islam by the West and by ruling elites of Islamic countries. Their goal, inter alia, is to purge Muslim societies of immorality and non-Islamic practices and to restore what they view as a pure form of Islam.2 They believe that acts of terrorism are a justified means of achieving these goals. Within less than three decades, the Salafi-jihadi ideology has significantly impacted world affairs. It has given rise to organizations such as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Yemen and North Africa, Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn in Somalia, Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn in Gaza and Sinai, Jabhat al-Nuṣra in Syria, Anṣār al-Sharīʻa in Yemen and Egypt, and Fatḥ al-Islām in Lebanon and Gaza.
In this article I argue that an important development has occurred within the contemporary Salafi-jihadi camp. Material published on jihad websites in the last few years reflects an imminent and noteworthy split within the Salafijihadi movement. Evidence suggests that the Salafi-jihadi community has split into two in Jordan3 -Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris4 -and that a similar split may be occurring in other countries as well.5 The newly emerged Neo-Takfirism embraces some of the ideas promoted by Sayyid Quṭb and radical thinkers and leaders inspired by him (e.g., Shukrī Muṣṭafā, 'Abd al-Salām Faraj) between the 1950s and the 1980s and includes some new ideological features. This article describes the emerging rift within the Salafi-jihadi camp, examines its causes and assesses the ideological questions that mark the fault line between Salafijihadis and Neo-Takfiris.
Historical Background: The Emergence of Ultra-Extremist Tendencies within the Salafi-Jihadi Camp
Although Salafism attracted popular attention in the West only after the 9/11 attacks, its ideological roots are as old as Islam itself.6 Salafis are believers who posit that the Qurʼān and the Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet) are the only legitimate sources of law, aspire to emulate the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims in their worship and daily conduct, strive to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements and deem it obligatory to declare as apostates Muslims who violate certain Islamic laws (e.g, engaging in witchcraft). source among Salafis today.8 Salafism emerged as a socio-political movement in the eighteenth century when the combination of Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's (1703-1792) fervor and Muḥammad Ibn Saʻūd's (d. 1765) military force yielded a powerful movement that used the sword to impose Salafi ideas on the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula. This early form of militant Salafism was a major source of inspiration for Salafi-jihadis in the early 1990s.9 Another important figure in the evolution of modern militant Salafism was Sayyid Quṭb . His notion of al-jāhiliyya al-ḥadītha (a modern form of idolatry comparable to that of pre-Islamic Arabia), his idea of ḥākimiyya (the indivisible sovereignty of God) and his insistence on reforming Muslim society by force coincided with eighteenth-century Wahhabi theory and practice and inspired revolutionary groups in Egypt, Syria and other Muslim countries in the 1970s and 1980s. As demonstrated below, the ideas promoted by Quṭb and his followers coincide in part with notions advanced today by adherents of NeoTakfirism. Two particular issues stand out. The first is the claim that Muslims living under apostate regimes are apostate simply by virtue of their political leaders' apostasy. The second is the idea that Muslims must make jihad against the "near enemy" (i.e., the Muslim apostate) a top priority and postpone jihad against the "far enemy" (mainly Jews and Christians) until Islamic rule is re-established. 10 A third factor that contributed to the growth of contemporary Salafi-Jihadism was the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Quṭb's ideas were introduced into Afghanistan by Egyptian jihadists. These ideas merged with the Wahhabi ideology introduced into Afghanistan by Saudi jihadis and Saudi trained ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Followers of al-Qaeda's network solidified the newly formed ideology in the early 1990s.
Salafiyya in Jordan
The emergence of the Salafi ideology in Jordan is linked to the Syrian Salafi scholar Muḥammad Nāsir al-Dīn al-Albānī. During the 1970s many Jordanian students travelled to Syria to study with al-Albānī. The number of Jordanian [Jordan] to visit the homes of jihad activists in various cities. In the early 1990s, al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi founded the secret Bayʻat al-Imām13 organization".14 Al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi actively taught and spread the Salafijihadi creed in many parts of Jordan. What increased the receptiveness of the ideas they disseminated was the fact that Islamists, Salafis and others had become disillusioned with the Jordanian regime and state, viewing the former as impious and as such illegitimate, and the latter as morally corrupt. As Wagemakers pointed out, when al-Maqdisi started preaching in Jordan the seeds of his ideology had already been sown. There were several radical groups in Jordan, including:
Muhammad's Army (Jaysh Muhammad), a group that is said to have been founded by a former Muslim Brother, the "Afghan Arab" Sami Abu Al-Maqdisi explains that the book was intended to undermine efforts by Jordanian authorities to present the entire Salafi-jihadi camp as Neo-Takfiri. This suggests that Salafi-jihadis were very careful in applying the doctrine of takfīr, unlike Neo-Takfiris who eventually were expelled from the ranks of the Salafi-jihadis.
Signs of a Growing Rift Within the Salafi-Jihadi Camp: The al-Zarqawi Phase
The first public signs of the growing tension within the Jordanian Salafi-jihadi camp appeared in the middle 1990s when al-Zarqawi, then in prison, rebelled against the authority and teachings of his mentor and fellow prisoner al-Maqdisi.20 Upon his release from prison in 1999, al-Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan, and the rift began to emerge. His relocation to Afghanistan gave him an opportunity to establish his own authority independent of al-Maqdisi's and to develop his own understanding of the Salafi-jihadi creed. The letter implies that al-Zarqawi had developed his own ideas regarding the legal status of civilians in contemporary Muslim countries. Since these countries are no longer subject to sharīʻa laws, al-Zarqawi insisted that their citizens are no different from infidels living in the West. In addition, he apparently disagreed with al-Maqdisi on the issue of proclaiming takfīr against ordinary unlearned Shiʻis and on the legality of targeting non-combatant infidels and Muslims. Al-Zarqawi's response to this letter was much more direct and explicit than al-Maqdisi's original rebuke. In an audio message posted on Islamist websites in July 2005, he openly disagreed with al-Maqdisi and rejected his criticism of the mujahidin's policies in Iraq. Citing Islamic sources, he argued that it is justified to attack non-combatant Muslims and non-Muslims in Iraq if they assist the enemy in any way, and that it is permitted to kill Shiʻi civilians because they are apostates who ally with the Crusaders.28 refer to the latter category as dār kufr al-ṭāriʼ (the "renewed abode of infidelity"), a term they apply to most Muslim countries today. 27 http://www.almahdy.biz/vb/showthread.php?t=3301. 28
In the message, al-Zarqawi explained: "When the [Americans] realized that they were in dire straits and that their losses were high, they rushed to form [Iraqi] army units and the [Iraqi] 'National Guard,' so as to create a protective shield for the Crusaders and an arm to strike the jihad fighters. Lowly people responded to their call, betrayed their religion, and relinquished their divine reward. The jihad fighters' verdict for them is plain and clear, without any ambiguity -namely, that it is obligatory to wage jihad against them, because they have committed apostasy and allied themselves with the Crusaders. Sheikh [al-Maqdisi] has expressed reservations about our fighting Shiʻis, and claimed that ordinary Shiʻis are like ordinary Sunnis. To this I respond: 'As for fighting Shiʻis, we have declared a number of times... that we did not start the fighting... but that it was they who started to liquidate the cadres of Sunnis and to expel them, and to take over their mosques and homes. The crimes of the al-Badr Brigades are still fresh to us, not to mention the fact that they that do not fully apply sharīʻa law) and prohibits adherents from greeting apostates and/or infidels with the phrase al-salāmu ʻalaykum (peace be upon you).33 Al-Zarqawi's conduct earned him the reputation of a devout militant who remained firm in his adherence to the doctrine even at the risk of incurring severe punishment from prison authorities. This characterization is reinforced when the writer contrasts al-Zarqawi's conduct with that of al-Maqdisi: While it is possible that the writer's account of policemen consulting with alZarqawi is merely a polemical claim, the fact that the writer attributes religious authority to al-Zarqawi despite the latter's obviously inferior level of learning as compared to al-Maqdisi is noteworthy.
The closing sentence of the letter points to the superiority of piety over scholarship in the eyes of al-Zarqawi's followers: "[O sheikh al-Maqdisi,] if I ask why you, who are still in prison, are not the Amīr (the leader), despite the fact that you are [the eminent scholar] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, whereas the Amīr is uneducated... I would reply: 'Be brave and tell the truth, my Sheikh..!'" Here, the author chastises al-Maqdisi for not having the courage (and ultimately the piety) manifested by al-Zarqawi in acknowledging the true doctrine and acting upon it regardless of the consequences. Clearly, both Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris advocate religious activism, particularly waging jihad and confronting apostates/infidels. Both argue that the creed (ʻaqīdah) of purging Islamic society of non-Islamic practices and of establishing an Islamic state must be implemented through the method (manhaj) of struggle and not solely through preaching, education or asceticism. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two ideological trends. NeoTakfiris appear to consider resolute confrontation as a required form of piety and thus as a goal in itself. By contrast, Salafi-jihadis view confrontation as a means to achieve the end goal of establishing an Islamic state that should be employed only under appropriate circumstances and subject to the restrictions of Islamic law. Accordingly, Salafi-jihadis insist on having a solid understanding of the legal principles of jihad, in order to ensure that they operate within the boundaries of the law and that they carry out the Divine will in the most accurate way. For Salafi-jihadis, a lack of profound knowledge of the law (and creed) necessarily renders one's religious stance imperfect and one's spiritual authority deficient.
It is important to note that Salafi-jihadis pursue legal knowledge not for the sake of erudition per-se but rather for the sake of application (taṭbīq). Their writings invoke the classical notion that "knowledge should be sought for sake of practice" (al-̒ ilm li'l-ʻamal).35 By contrast, Neo-Takfiris consider uncompromising zeal to constitute perfect piety. For them, a person who is not zealous lacks religiosity and authority. Indeed, al-Zarqawi's followers considered his piety as a legitimate and sufficient basis for religious authority. Erudition and scholarship were secondary. 36 In the eyes of al-Zarqawi's followers, a Muslim's what al-Maqdisi terms "hollow zeal."37 Al-Maqdisi may be exaggerating when he asserts that Neo-Takfiris never even consider opening a book, but the essence of his characterization may be correct: They deem the pursuit of knowledge as less important than zeal which, for them, constitutes the epitome of piety.38
The appeal of al-Zarqawi's piety-based authority can be explained, at least partially, by the character of the prisoners who adopted his creed and became his followers. Many of them were petty criminals who were regularly in and out of jail. Here, al-Maqdisi implicitly contrasts responsible scholarship, based on accurate definitions and exact legal distinctions, with extremism (i.e., Neo-Takfirism), which is anchored in impulsiveness, religious fervor and ignorance. Al-Maqdisi suggests that the Neo-Takfiris are deficient in their learning and thus have no legitimate claim to any religious standing or prestige.
The Rift During the Post-Zarqawi Era: The Emergence of a Rudimentary Neo-Takfiri Doctrine
Information about the tension within the Salafi-jihadi camp after al-Zarqawi's death in 2006 is sparse, because Islamist websites and other media rarely allude to it, and when they do, they usually present, with few exceptions, the Salafijihadi standpoint and ignore the Neo-Takfiri one. There is, however, evidence indicating the existence of Neo-Takfirism in Jordan and elsewhere, as reflected Al-Maqdisi's call for disassociation from Neo-Takfiris and for their open condemnation, and Salafi descriptions of Neo-Takfiris as extremists whose creed is "equivalent to that of the Khawārij (a seventh century group considered deviant by mainstream Sunni Muslims),"48 confirm that by 2009 Salafi-jihadism and Salafi-Takfirism had become two distinct movements, with different views on major doctrinal issues and distinct perceptions of the basis for legitimate religious authority.
Doctrinal Disagreements Between Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris
The emotional conflict among Salafi-jihadis in Jordan, which ultimately divided them into two distinct religious trends -a Salafi-jihadi trend with a considerable following and a Neo-Takfiri trend with an unknown number of followers -cannot have been fueled merely by a disagreement about sundry legal issues or the sources of legitimate authority. What, then, is the root-cause of the disagreement between the two groups? A closer look at the specific doctrinal issues that Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris debate offers important insight into 48 On the term Khawārij in modern Sunni-Salafi and intra-Salafi polemics, see Daniel Lav,
Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, 2012).
the fundamental cause of the tension between them. The principles of NeoTakfiri doctrine, which is still in the early stages of development, appear in a variety of sources but have not yet been compiled in a single book or corpus of writings. At present, much of the information about this nascent creed comes from the rival camp, the Salafi-jihadis. However, documents written by NeoTakfiris, questions addressed to Salafi-jihadi sheikhs (that describe Neo-Takfiri tendencies worldwide), books published by Neo-Takfiris and websites administered by them corroborate most of the accounts of Neo-Takfirism found in Salafi-jihadi writings. Based on the available information, the major jurisprudential distinctions between the two camps appear to be related to the following issues.
What Constitutes Proof of Apostasy For most Sunnis, belief (imān), which is a matter of the heart, is established through affirmation (taṣdīq) and is not conditioned on one's commitment to religious practice. Hence, once a person affirms his belief, any failure to fulfill the legal requirements that accompany this belief does not render him an apostate but only a sinner. By contrast, Salafis maintain that belief is established through intention, affirmation, and practice (al-imān niyya qawl wa-ʻamal). Therefore, they view a Muslim who consistently disobeys the requirements of the law as an apostate. However, Salafis disagree among themselves on which sins or violations of the law constitute apostasy. Neo-Takfiris argue that if a Muslim man shaves his beard, adopts Western dress or imitates infidels in any way, he may be proclaimed an apostate whose life and property are forfeit.49 By contrast, Salafi-jihadis contend that such practices do not constitute sufficient legal grounds to proclaim takfīr against a Muslim (i.e. to declare him an apostate).50 For them, the only exception to this rule is the wearing of the attire of, or the use of instruments related to, infidels' religious symbols (e.g., a priest's gown or a cross The Legal Status of Citizens in Muslim Countries Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris both maintain that in a country ruled by sharīʻa law, all citizens are assumed to be believing Muslims unless their conduct or appearance indicates otherwise. This principle is known as al-aṣl fī'l-nās al-Islām. Under this principle, for example, an individual in a country which accepts the sharīʻa as its only source of law may assume that his fellow worshipers at the mosque are Muslims and he does not have to inquire into their actual beliefs.52 That individual may also sell weapons in the open market (a sale permitted only between Muslims), and he may assume that the purchaser is a Muslim without verifying his religious identity.53
However, Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris disagree over the status of Muslims in dār al-kufr al-ṭāriʼ, a Muslim country in which sharīʻa law once was, but is no longer, fully and exclusively applied, as is the case in all Muslim countries today. Salafi-jihadis consider such countries to be diyār murakkaba (territories whose status is compounded), in which signs of apostasy are manifested but whose citizens are still assumed to be Muslims.54 Thus, they contend that one should assume that citizens of such a country are Muslims, unless their behavior or appearance indicates otherwise.
Neo-Takfiris,55 by contrast, assume that citizens of these countries are infidels (al-kuffār al-aṣlīyūn), like the citizens of non-Muslim countries.56 A NeoTakfiri writer with the nom de plume Abū Maryam al-Kuwaitī provides the rationale for the Neo-Takfiri position:
If the infidels [i.e., people who have never been Muslims] or apostates overcome the abode of Islam, and this abode submits itself to them without fighting the infidels or resisting them, the people of this territory are collectively considered to be apostates, even if there are among them 52 According to some Muslim scholars, the presence of an infidel worshipper at mosque during public prayer can invalidate the prayer of believers attending the mosque. The Neo-Takfiri position on apostasy is consistent with the view expressed by Sayyid Quṭb in the 1950s and by Shukrī Muṣṭafā (the leader of the violent Egyptian organization "al-Takfīr wa'l-Hijra") in the 1970s.61 Both men regarded Muslim society in its entirety as Jāhilī, i.e., a non-Islamic idol worshiping society). Quṭb declared in court: "We are the true community of believers that lives in the midst of a Jāhilī society. We have no links to either the state or to society … and as a community of believers we see ourselves at war with the state and society …"62 Shukrī Muṣṭafā told his interrogators that whoever does not accept his group's ideology is an apostate (aḥkumu ʻalyahi bi'l-kufr).63
The Neo-Takfiri view has numerous practical implications. Neo-Takfiris reportedly regard the property of citizens in Muslim countries as legitimate booty -just like the property of people in the abode of war (dār al-ḥarb) or the abode of unbelief (dār al-kufr). In addition, some Neo-Takfiris in Jordan apparently refuse to greet people on the street even if their dress is Islamic, unless Collective Proclamations of Takfīr Salafi-jihadis reject the notion of collective proclamations of takfīr (takfīr bi'lʻumūm).66 They maintain that proclamations of takfīr can be made only against specific individuals (a procedure known as takfīr muʻayyan), based on convincing evidence. In addition, before proclaiming takfīr against an individual, one must rule out all potential mitigating circumstances: the accused must be a mature adult, it must be proven that he acted intentionally and of his own free will and it must be shown that he was aware of the fact that his act was sinful.67 This approach to proclaiming takfīr is manifest in the answer given by Sheikh Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī, a prominent Salafi-jihadi authority who currently resides in London, to a question addressed to him on whether the prevailing custom among Muslims today of visiting graves and supplicating the dead renders these Muslims apostates. In his reply, al-Ṭarṭūsī held that apostasy may be declared only against individuals, and only after evidence has been produced that the individual knowingly followed the grave-visiting custom.68
Neo-Takfiris, by contrast, allow sweeping proclamations of takfīr against entire groups of people. In this they resemble their counterparts in Egypt in the 1960s-1980s (Sayyid Quṭb, Shukrī Muṣṭafā, and ʻAbd al-Salām Faraj), who defined the entire Egyptian society as apostate. A question addressed to al-Maqdisi suggests that some Muslims today consider their co-religionists apostates simply because they appeal to apostate rulers. 64 Neo-Takfiris probably fear to violate the Prophet's instruction as expressed in the ḥadīth "Do not initiate greetings of al-salām [i.e., al-salāmu ʻalaykum) to Jews and Christian (i.e., to non-Muslims) (lā tabdaʼūʼ al-yahūd wa'lā al-naṣāraʼ bi'l-salām). 65 http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=3368&param=AJT. See also al-Maqdisi, al-Risāla al-thalāthīniyya, 108. Neo-Takfiris are concerned that if they greet people on the street with the phrase "Peace be upon" (which is reserved exclusively for Muslims) and these people turn out to be non-Muslims, they would be at fault for violating the Prophet's instruction: "Do not greet Jews and Christian with Salām …" (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Kitāb al-Salām I do not permit today the blood and property of people even if they commit shirk (association of any deity with God) because of the lack of public announcement (balāgh 'āmm) [warning people against shirk] … This does not mean that I do not consider a person who committed shirk to be an apostate because it is clear that he is an apostate who must be excommunicated. At the same time, however, his blood and property are not permitted until evidence is brought against him [that he was warned about his transgression but he persisted in it].71
According to Abū Maryam, issuance of a warning is a prerequisite to applying all the implications of takfīr against an individual apostate, particularly in a place or time in which the phenomenon of apostasy is common among Muslims.
Proclaiming Takfīr against Government Employees Salafi-jihadis do not proclaim takfīr against all government employees of Muslim states that are not under sharīʻa law, but only against those employees whose occupation is directly linked to activities that Salafi-jihadis regard as kufr (infidelity) or shirk, such as enforcing secular legislation or assisting the govern-Alshech islamic law and society 21 (2014) 419-452 ment to take action against pious Muslims or the mujāhidūn.72 Neo-Takfiris, by contrast, consider all government employees in any country not run in accordance with sharīʻa to be apostates, and thus issue a general proclamation of takfīr (takfīr bi'l-ʻumūm) against them, solely on the basis of their association with the apostate "tyrants" (i.e. the authorities).73 Such association, they claim, is in-and-of itself a violation of the al-walā' wa'l-barā' doctrine, which regards any association with an apostate as an act of apostasy. In so holding, NeoTakfiris construe Qurʼān 5:54 literally: "O You who believe, take not Jews and Christians [i.e., infidels] as associates for they are associates of each other. And he amongst you who takes them as associates becomes one of them." A question addressed to sheikh al-Ṭarṭūsī by a resident in Iraq indicates that this position on the apostasy of government employees has gained currency among some jihadists in Iraq:
Our respected sheikh. An extreme sect has splintered from the jihadists in Iraq … They claim that the default status (al-aṣl) of Iraqi society [today] is apostasy until it is proven otherwise … And they say also that any [government] employee in Iraq now is an apostate such as the employees of [the Ministries of] Education, Training and Health …74
In short, for Neo-Takfiris, employment by an apostate government is a form of association that is forbidden. An employee of an apostate state necessarily partakes in the regime's apostasy, whether or not he himself commits an apostatizing act. 72 http://www.tawhed.ws/r1?i=4781&x=jzoyrjz8. In a similar manner, Sheikh Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī permits to work for organizations controlled by the United Nations, on the condition that the position does not directly promote or facilitate apostasy or sin. See abu baseer.bizland.com/verdicts/read/26-50.doc, question number 26. See al-Maqdisi's detailed answer regarding the proclamation of takfīr on the Hamas government, http:// shomookhelhaq.mam9.com/t686-topic. Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī holds that one must bring proof establishing that a Muslim who entered an apostate parliament was warned, before takfīr is proclaimed against him. Al-Ṭarṭūsī explains that it is possible that this Muslim member of the parliament was following one of the mistaken legal opinions issued by Muslim scholars that permit Muslims to join an apostate parliament. Pledging Loyalty to the Correct Imam Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris also disagree over the correct understanding of the following Prophetic hadith: "One who dies without having pledged loyalty [to an Imam, i.e., leader] dies a jāhilī death." Both Neo-Takfiris and Jihadis construe the phrase "jāhilī death" to mean dying in a state of apostasy, as did the people of the Jāhiliyya (pre-Islamic era). They contend that any Muslim who fails to pledge loyalty to an Imam is an apostate. However, they disagree over who is a legitimate Imam. Neo-Takfiris maintain that there is only one legitimate Imam to whom all Muslims must pledge loyalty at any given time. Since they regard themselves as the only 'righteous society' (jamāʻat al-ḥaqq), they consider their Imam to be the only legitimate Imam, and any Muslim who does not pledge allegiance to him is thus an apostate.75 This position concurs with Shukrī Muṣṭafā's statement that whoever does not accept his group's ideology is declared an apostate by him (aḥkumu ʻalayhi bi'l-kufr).76
Salafi-jihadis, by contrast, maintain that there is more than one legitimate Imam (leader), and that a Muslim may pledge loyalty to the Imam of his choice so long as the Imam follows what they perceive to be the correct path.77
Attending Prayers led by a Government-appointed Imam
According to Salafi-jihadis, it is forbidden to attend services led by a government appointed Imam who actively promotes the government's apostate ideology. Prayers said in the presence of such an imam are null. However, if the Imam acts as a prayer-leader solely for the purpose of making a living, and if he does not promote the government's apostate ideology, then it is permitted (albeit not recommended) to attend his service;78 provided that he does not end his prayer with an invocation to God to bless the apostate ruler.79
By contrast, Neo-Takfiris "forbid praying with any Imam appointed by the Ministry of Endowments (ʻulamā' al-awqāf), and some even proclaim takfīr against all such Imams."80 Such a position is manifested in a question addressed to Sheikh al-Ṭarṭūsī: commentaries. The nation in its entirety knows that the Turkish state is secular and it rules by a law other than Allah's …83
Differentiating between Administrative and Substantive Laws Neo-Takfiris and Salafi-jihadis prohibit following any man-made law that directly contradicts the Qurʼān and the Sunna, such as a law banning polygamy or permitting usury.84 However, the two camps appear to disagree over adherence to administrative law. Salafi-jihadi texts accuse Neo-Takfiris of forbidding Muslims from obeying any law created by an apostate ruler, including rules that do not contradict the Qurʼān or the Sunna. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi states:
One of their [i.e., the Neo-Takfiris'] most common mistakes in proclaiming takfīr … is not distinguishing between following and turning to administrative law and between relying on apostate legislation. Some of the extreme and ignorant Takfiris proclaim takfīr against every person who obeys ordinances, instructions, or regulations issued by administrative entities, organizations, institutions, companies and their administration. They consider these [rules] to be apostate legislation …"85 However, two texts posted on the Neo-Takfiri website www.twhed.com, seem to contradict al-Maqdisi's accusation. A writer using the nickname Anṣār Allah explains that he rejects traffic laws not because they are inherently apostate but because they incorporate punishments and regulations that are incompatible with the teachings of the Qurʼān and the Sunna: This last sentence directly contradicts al-Maqdisi's depiction of Neo-Takfiris as refraining from applying for drivers' licenses and passports and as proclaiming takfīr against any Muslim who agrees to pay for a bus ticket or an electric bill because the rates have been set by an apostate government.88
Other texts on Neo-Takfiri websites demonstrate that Neo-Takfiris are not unanimous on the question of administrative law. For example, a writer using the nom de plume al-Luqmān rejects the attempt to distinguish between administrative and sharīʻa law. According to him, since contemporary Muslim rulers claim lordship (rabūbiyya), a divine characteristic, and believe that authority belongs to them (lahum al-ḥukm), believers must not submit even to their administrative law. Following their administrative law, claims al-Luqmān, necessarily indicates one's acceptance of their lordship and thus one's recognition of lordship other than Allah's. 89 Interestingly, the debate among Neo-Takfiris about administrative law may be a manifestation of the disagreement that al-Maqdisi described as having occurred in Zarqa. Neo-Takfiris may be divided over how to assess whether it is permissible to adhere to a code of law. Jihad against the "Near Enemy" and the "Far Enemy" Salafi-jihadis view jihad against apostates ("the near enemy") and jihad against infidels ("the far enemy") as equally obligatory for Muslims today. The Status of Sinners Neo-Takfiris hold that sinners who commit major sins (kabā'ir), and who die without repenting their sins, are apostates doomed to eternal hellfire.96 Salafijihadis, by contrast, hold that such sinners, unlike apostates, may be saved from Hell at God's will after a certain period of time.97
Conclusion
What started as a tension within the Salafi-jihadi camp in the mid-1990s turned into an open rift a decade later, giving rise to a new ideological trend, NeoTakfirism, which mirrors some of the views expressed by the Takfiris between the 1950s and the 1970s. The information available indicates that Neo-Takfirism has gained some currency in a growing number of Islamic countries in the past two decades, though it is unclear how many people follow this creed or whether they form actual communities. It is possible that the Neo-Takfiri views expressed in the texts cited in this study reflect the views of scattered individuals or small groups rather than consolidated communities. On the other hand, as Neo-Takfirism spreads worldwide, we may see the evolution of Neo-Takfiri communities.
At the core of the debate between Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris lie differing conceptions about what it means to lead a pure Islamic life in a morally corrupt environment, and, thus, about how to achieve salvation. Neo-Takfiris hold that only total rejection of society and uncompromising adherence to the Salafi creed guarantee one's salvation. Accordingly, they create and promote enclaves dominated by what they view as pure Islam, and keep their distance from the surrounding Muslim society, which they view as apostate society. By contrast, Salafi-jihadis hold that salvation is possible within the world as it exists today. Accordingly, they disassociate only from people or entities whose apostasy is unquestionable, while permitting cautious interaction with those whose conduct may be unacceptable but does not amount to apostasy. The differing ideologies have significant real-world consequences. In addition to disparate views about achieving salvation, Neo-Takfiris and Salafi-jihadis also disagree about what it means to be a true believer. According to Neo-Takfiris, in order to be a believing Muslim one must not only shun apostatizing actions but also avoid grave sins (kabā'ir), even if they do not rise to the level of apostasy. For them, a true Muslim must not resemble infidels in any way, must reject the apostate regime's authority (even in administrative matters that do not contradict the divine law, according to some Neo-Takfiris), and must sever his ties with any person or entity associated with an apostate ruler. By contrast, Salafi-jihadis consider a person who renounces apostasy and who eschews behaviors that are clearly apostatizing as a true Muslim, even if that person accepts the administrative authority of an apostate ruler and imitates infidels in his daily appearance and mundane conduct.
From a practical perspective, the difference between the two groups is significant. Neo-Takfiris are doctrinaires who regard themselves as being under an obligation to pursue their vision of a pure religious life at all costs. They do not adapt their religious ideals to the political and social reality in which they live. Salafi-jihadis are more pragmatic in their approach. They accept their "impure Islamic surrounding" as a reality with which they must cope, and they interpret their religious creed in ways that enable them to accommodate this reality. If a strict reading of Salafi-jihadi doctrine yields an undesirable social outcome, e.g., defining an entire Muslim society as an apostate society, Salafi-jihadis interpret their laws in a way that avoids such an outcome.98
The ideological disagreement between Salafi-jihadis and Neo-Takfiris has produced a power struggle, with each group attempting to impose its worldview on the general Salafi community. The representatives of both camps claim to 98 For example, some Salafi-jihadi sheikhs accept visas issued by an apostate government to infidel tourists as an agreement that protects tourists against harm, even though they generally accept only an agreement issued by a righteous imam. This is because they understand that at the present time a visa is accepted internationally as a form of agreement and that the tourists traveling with a visa expect to be protected while visiting the country that issued it.
possess authority to conclusively interpret religious law, but each camp has developed a significantly different notion of that authority. Both camps view authority as deriving from religious activism (either waging jihad or confronting the infidels/apostates). However, whereas Salafi-jihadis tie this activism to the acquisition of the relevant religious knowledge, Neo-Takfiris tie this activism to uncompromising confrontation with apostates regardless of the circumstances. For Neo-Takfiris, resolute confrontation is a central if not the ultimate aspect of piety and as such a source of religious authority. Interestingly, the disagreement over religious authority between Neo-Takfiris and Salafi-jihadis mirrors the disagreement between Salafi-jihadis and nonmilitant Salafis (salafiyya ʻIlmiyya) in the early 1990s in Saudi Arabia. Ironically, in the early 1990s -when Salafi-jihadis felt inferior in learning to non-militant Salafis -they claimed that religious authority is rooted in religious piety.99 Today, however, seizing upon the perception that their knowledge of Islamic law is far superior to that of al-Zarqawi and his followers, Salafi-jihadis claim that religious authority is anchored in learning and is not limited to piety. 
Epilogue

